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COP-5 in Bonn: Momentum Maintained
Report on the 5th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention
Bonn, Germany Oct. 25 - Nov. 5, 1999
The fifth Conference of the Parties (COP-5) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was held in Bonn, Germany over the last week of October and the first week of November, 1999. The meeting was attended by representatives of 166 countries, including over 60 ministers, as well as by observers from environmental organizations, academic institutions and industry associations. In all, well over 4,000 participants mobbed the conference center.
On the agenda was the continuing effort to hammer out the details necessary to implement the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Last year's COP meeting in Argentina concluded with the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, a process roadmap for taking decisions on the details necessary to implement the Kyoto Protocol by 2000. Since COP-5 was only the mid-point stop along the Plan's route, expectations for progress were modest from the outset. Indeed, the United Kingdom's Minister of the Environment, John Prescott, characterized COP-5 as "largely a tactical meeting".
It came as a bit of a surprise then that the delegates managed to make some real progress amid a generally positive atmosphere of real political will to move the process forward. A number of decisions were taken that settled important substantive, if relatively uncontroversial, issues, and delegates were also successful in agreeing on the steps and information gathering they require to make decisions on the issues specific of the Plan of Action. Nonetheless, in the year ahead culminating at COP-6 -- to be held in The Hague, Netherlands in November 2000 -- are the challenging tasks of crafting of negotiating texts and hammering out final agreements on large and contentious issues.
The Plan of Action Moves Forward
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action was the most significant accomplishment of the previous COP in that it set a deadline of COP-6 for nations to take decisions on the unresolved details of Kyoto Protocol. In particular, resolution is needed on the rules and guidelines necessary to implement the Protocol's so-called "flexibility mechanisms," which include emissions trading among industrialized countries, joint implementation of emissions reductions with the ex-Soviet block of nations, and the Clean Development Mechanism. The mechanisms are especially important to the US. In Bonn, the American delegation reiterated that workable and efficient mechanisms are one of the elements that must be in place in order for the Protocol to stand a chance of ratification by the US Senate.
At COP-5, discussions on the flexibility mechanisms were only successful in producing an agreed work plan to formulate a draft text before COP-6 that will be the basis for further negotiations. A considerable effort was made to conclude a draft negotiating text during COP-5 but was ultimately hindered by developing countries who thought it was premature to take that step. They wanted more time for countries to make proposals on how the mechanisms should operate.
That said, nations were not showing a lot of movement from their prior positions on the flexible mechanisms. Developing countries -- with some support from the US -- want to prioritize decisions on the Clean Development Mechanism and emphasize their participating in the CDM is motivated by its potential development benefits. Meanwhile, the European Union is still seeking to set a ceiling on the proportion of emissions reductions from flexible mechanisms that industrialized countries can use to fulfill their Kyoto commitments. The Kyoto Protocol says that mechanisms can only supplement domestic greenhouse gas emissions reductions but any limitation will be a contentious point with the US in future negotiations. The Clinton Administration's economic analysis of meeting the Kyoto target makes cost assumptions that imply that the US will be able to meet 75-80% of the mandated emissions reductions through actions under the flexible mechanisms.
Support Builds for Land-Use Change and Forestry Options
There were however more interesting developments in the discussions on individual mechanisms. For one, developing countries in general have become much more interested in ensuring land use change and forestry (LUCF) projects are eventually eligible under the CDM. The language of the Kyoto Protocol is vague as to what kinds of project types are allowable under the CDM, and the issue of including LUCF has been controversial. With some 20% of anthropogenic carbon emissions coming from deforestation and land degradation in the tropics, there is a compelling argument to include LUCP projects in the CDM. Doing so could potentially provide a new source for financing the protection of tropical forests and the ecosystem services they provide to local people.
In Bonn, all Latin American countries from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, with the exceptions of Peru and Brazil, joined together to formally advocate that forestry projects be eligible under the CDM, including conservation, restoration, and sustainable management. In addition, several African countries proposed that the CDM should include "emissions avoidance,, projects, potentially including avoiding deforestation and land conversion. This would make the CDM more relevant to Africa as its GHG emissions from fossil fuel burning are less than 2% of the global total but its emissions from the LUCF sector are relatively large.
The absence of Brazil's participation in the initiative is a huge omission. Along with small island states and some Asian countries, it has reservation about bringing forestry into the Kyoto Protocol for developing countries. Brazil's concerns, however, carry particular weight. It is a key country not only because of its forestry resources but also because of its considerable political clout at the climate negotiations. Fortunately, Brazil hasn't shut the door on forestry. Although it would not participate in the Latin American initiative, the Brazilians nonetheless seemed to want to avoid prematurely excluding any LUCF options. In their speech at the Ministerial session, for example, Brazil expressed its desire to wait on making decision on LUCF issues until the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change completes its Special Report on LUCF issues.
The Special Report was initiated by a request from nations to the IPCC in June 1998 and is currently undergoing its second peer-review by government-appointed experts. The final report is expected in May 2000, but the IPCC did present an overview of the current draft of the report at COP-5. The briefing, which lasted a full 4 hours, was packed with approximately 300 negotiators and NGO observers attending. This clearly reflected how much interest is growing in the implications of employing land use and forestry measures to mitigate climate change and not just in the CDM.
The Special Report will also contain information and options for negotiators on technical issues regarding the LUCF activities that industrialized countries are allowed to use domestically by the Kyoto Protocol to offset carbon emissions. These are limited by Article 3.3of the Protocol to afforestation and reforestation but other language, in Article 3.4, allows developed nations that option of new categories of LUCF activities at a later time. New categories could include relatively large-scale carbon offsets in, for example, the agriculture (via low- and no- till crop methods) and forestry sectors. These kinds of activities were not factored into the process that arrived at the levels of emissions reductions obligations agreed to in Kyoto so decisions about introducing 113.4 activities" are of large relevance to the integrity of the Kyoto targets. Many nations are concerned that allowing an unrestricted range of supplementary forestry and agriculture offsets under Article 3.4 will delay actions to reduce emissions from fossil fuel consumption. The particular risk causing concerns is that industrialized nations will recalculate their national emissions to include a whole series of LUCF offset windfalls that may include many business-as-usual activities. This could, in effect, compromise the environmental benefits of Kyoto Protocol.
Environmental Effectiveness Key to Including Forests
Clearly, the decisions that negotiators will make about definitions, carbon accounting, monitoring and reporting, as well as what new LUCF activities can be used and when, could greatly influence how countries attain their emissions reduction obligations. While they anticipate the IPCC Special Report, delegates, discussions at COP-5 were principally concerned with the implications of the degree and magnitude of LUCF activities on the Kyoto targets. After intense deliberations, the negotiators agreed to an LUCF work plan that in essence asks countries to furnish supplementary information and data on how they intended to use and account for LUCF activities. Along with a special presentation by the IPCC on the Special Report next June, this information should give negotiators the information they need to make environmentally effective decisions.
For the environmental NGOS, environmental effectiveness will be the key criteria for including LUCF measures as emissions mitigation options. Many groups have concerns about the timing of introducing 3.4 activities (i. e. they should be introduced only after the first 2008-2012 commitment period), while others, notably the World wildlife Fund and Greenpeace, also continue their opposition to allowing LUCF into the CDM. UCS takes the position that LUCF initiatives should be part of the climate change solution but strong rules are needed to ensure that only environmentally sound activities that are clear additional to business-as-usual are available as options. Furthermore, countries should employ LUCF initiatives as part of an overall GHG emissions reduction strategy that focuses on the long term curbing of emissions from fossil fuel consumption.
Towards this end, on October 27th UCS hosted a workshop in Bonn, entitled "Land-use Change and Forestry in the CDM: Issues, Opportunities and Risks," with three other organizations (the Center for Sustainable Development in the Americas, The Nature Conservancy and Fundacion Moises Bertoni, a conservation oriented organization based in Paraguay). It was an opportunity to engage and educate delegates from key developing countries on the potential and the benefits of LUCF projects in order for them to be better positioned to make sound decisions when the IPCC Special Report emerges in 2000.
The workshop was well attended by approximately 55 participants, chiefly from Latin America and Africa. They heard four presentations on technical issues and the potential for environmental and socioeconomic co-benefits from LUCF projects, as well as some of the risks and concerns of participating in projects. Overall, UCS achieved our near-term goal of catalyzing a timely developing-country-to-developing-country dialogue on the LUCF issue. Future workshops will seek to do capacity building around the IPCC Special Report and engage more biodiversity organizations in the discussions.
UCS also took the opportunity to circulate a new publication in Bonn. Co-authored by economist Jared Hardner, UCS Global Resources Dept. Director Peter Frumhoff and UCS Staff Scientist Darren Goetze, the paper examines the opportunity for LUCF projects to cost-effectively offset carbon emissions while conserving forests and their biological diversity and assisting developing countries in their sustainable development. The paper will appear in a forthcoming special issue of the journal "Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change."
Consensus on Compliance
International agreements like the Kyoto Protocol are difficult to enforce because there is no international policing agent that can penalize sovereign nations. It's vital to the long-term success of the climate change mitigation process to construct a compliance regime that spells out binding consequences for countries that fail to meet their commitments under the Protocol. Indeed, the integrity of the Kyoto targets can only be assured if all the participating nations agree to some kind of compliance mechanism that will instill confidence in the international community that individual nations have fulfilled their commitments. One of the big successes at Buenos Aires last year was a decision by negotiators to establish a workgroup on the issue of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, largely due to the persistent efforts on non-governmental organizations, including UCS.
In Bonn, nations made further progress on the compliance issue. A consensus emerged that a future compliance body should have both a facilitative role (that is, promoting compliance and preventing non-compliance) and an enforcement capacity to determine non-compliance and apply consequences. However, the technical details of how a compliance body would work and its exact mandate cold not yet be finalized. Although five different proposals for compliance systems were offered for review in Bonn, in the end the delegates agreed that much work remains to be done. A decision on a compliance system will only be possible in the short term if current efforts to agree on a single negotiable proposal are intensified. Accordingly, the COP decided to hold a compliance workshop in March 2000 after giving nations the chance to submit new proposals by the end of next January. The goal is to be able to decide on a compliance system by COP-6, likely an ambitious undertaking.
Developing Countries Further their "Meaningful Participation"
Once again at COP-5, several developing countries explicitly acknowledged that once industrialized countries have made substantive progress towards reducing their emissions, all countries will have to eventually participate in efforts to combat climate change. However, two countries have decided to jump the gun. During the Ministerial segment of COP-5, Argentina came through on its promise made in Buenos Aires to propose specific targetsfor voluntary binding emissions limitation obligations. Accordingly, Argentina -- while stressing it is not abandoning its developing country status -- is willing to take on a voluntary target of reducing its emission growth rate by 2-10% below its projected business-as-usual scenario for 2008-2012. Employing a different strategy, Kazhakstan, which had also first signaled its intentions in Buenos Aires, said it wanted delegates at COP-5 to make a decision to allow it to join the group of industrialized nations with binding emissions reduction targets. However, in the end, the COP decided to defer consideration of Kazhakstan's request until COP-6.
However, delegates were successful in taking decisions that will advance the ability of developing countries to meet their obligations under Climate Convention and participate more fully in mitigating climate change. They resolved to continue efforts to address the difficulties faced by developing countries in preparing and delivering their national reports on climate change and to build capacity in developing countries by using financial assistance through existing agencies and assessing the effectiveness of current capacity building programs. The COP also noted that fully 22 developing countries have already submitted their national communications and concluded that overall developing nations are fulfilling their obligations under the Climate Convention.
Another significant development at COP-5 was a not-so- subtle change in the relationship among developing countries. The Climate Convention mandates in its Article 4 that developing countries vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change should be financially and technically assisted with adaptation strategies and tools. At previous meetings, key members of the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) have successfully warped the discussion on the adaptation to include the issue of how they should be financially compensated for losses in oil revenue as the world scales back its fossil fuel consumption. Even though all Parties, including the G77+China, have largely recognized this tactic and its accompanying procedural maneuvers as a willful effort to hinder progress in general, they have in the past not been successful in thwarting it. At COP-5, however, there was a sea change. The negotiators agreed to a decision that effectively segregates the compensation issue away from discussions on meeting the adaptation needs of other developing countries. in fact, for the first time, OPEC and its narrow interests were isolated, and its ability to impede the proceedings was at last restricted.
The United States: Faking Action on Climate Change?
Meanwhile, the US seemed to be taking pains to show it was also living up to its obligations to counter claims from the environmental and international communities of US inaction. The Administration's strategy in Bonn was in part trying to demonstrate to the world that the US is more committed than ever to mitigating climate change, despite recent setbacks with Congress on energy efficiency and renewable energy measures and efforts to raise fuel economy standards for autos and light trucks. In Bonn, the US delegation released a report, entitled "Taking Action on Climate Change," which aimed to highlight US actions to reduce domestic GHG emissions. In response, several of the environmental groups present at the meeting, including UCS, released a counter-report entitled "United States - FAKING Action on Climate Change." This response outlined the inconsistencies in the US report, as well as substantive areas where the US has failed to take necessary action domestically.
In COP-5 discussions, the US positions have not substantively changed on many issues. In his speech during the ministerial session, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Frank Loy emphasized - almost as a warning - that the negotiations must produce an agreement that gives the Kyoto Protocol a chance of ratification by the US Senate. Of paramount importance to assure ratification are cost effectiveness and "meaningful participation by key developing countries." Further hedging on the ratification issue, the US was only willing to go so far as to support entry-into-force of the Protocol "at the earliest possible date."
Some observers had the perception that the US was dictating terms to the rest of the world, something that may be emerging with worrying frequency in US foreign policy. In a development just before COP-5, the US Senate voted to not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while both the Congress and the Administration seriously talk of trying to renegotiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a move that could wreck one of the cornerstones of 20th century arms control. These moves raised concerns in the international community that the US is wavering in its commitment to multilateralism in global affairs. This has implications for the climate negotiations. Even Mr. Loy, commenting in the International Herald Tribute, said that while arms control and climate change were not related, recent US actions in the two fields are fueling perceptions that the US is determined to play by a separate set of rules that it alone will determine. In future sessions of the climate negotiations, the US delegation may find itself having to make concessions to bolster the confidence of the international community that it is serious about its Kyoto Protocol obligations and combating climate change.
The Road to COP-6 ... and Ratification?
In perhaps the most heartening development at COP-5, a notably high level of consensus was expressed by many nations - though not by US - in support of the early entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol by 2002. In fact, the countries that support this goal, including the European Union and Japan, amount to 40% of the GHG emissions from industrialized nations. Since the Kyoto Protocol requires 50 nations representing 55% of industrialized nations, emissions, Russia now holds the balance of power. If it agreed to ratify by 2002, this would trigger the Protocol's entry into force. This potential scenario brings significant pressure on the countries that could not be pinned down to support the 2002 entry-into-force date, such as the US, Canada and Australia.
The holdout nations will likely wait for the hard decisions to be made on the details of how the Kyoto Protocol will be implemented. The progress made at COP-5 has laid the foundation for negotiating texts to be produced in time for COP-6 and thus for the unfinished details of the Kyoto Protocol to be resolved. Nevertheless, to achieve this goal, negotiators face what FCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit Cutajar described as their own "own Y2K challenge: how to work out a deal ... that will advance the implementation of the Convention and make the Protocol ratifiable.
by Darren Goetze, PhD
November 1999
Acknowledgements
The review and comments provided by Alden Meyer and Peter Frumhoff are gratefully acknowledged.
This report may not be reprinted or posted to electronic networks without permission and acknowledgement.
Appendix
Emissions Facts - At 140 million tons C in 1992, emissions from global aviation - including passenger, freight and military - were ca. 67% of the emissions of the continent of Africa (209mmt C/yr). Source: IPCC, EIA
- From 1980 to 1989, net carbon emissions from land-use change, deforestation and forest degradation in the tropics were 1.6 billion tons C/yr, roughly 20% of total annual anthropogenic emissions. Source: IPCC
- In 1998, the world's economy grew by 2.5% while global anthropogenic carbon emissions declined by 0.5 % (to 6.32 billion tons C). This is the first time such a decoupling of economic growth and carbon emissions has been observed. Source: The Worldwatch Institute
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© Union of Concerned Scientists
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